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 35 The Normate
Joel Michael Reynolds
Phenomena appear in relation to one’s approach and method. !e slogan of phenome-
nology, “Back to the things themselves” (Zurück zu den Sachen selbst), is in part a call to 
unlearn and unknow, to carry out a suspension, a bracketing (epokh!), that brings things 
to awareness not as they appear by habit, custom, or caprice, but from themselves.1 !is 
means that insofar as one holds cognition, consciousness, perception, and awareness 
to be irremediably embodied, one cannot bracket the body.2 Critical disability studies 
scholars have argued that a central and ongoing misstep in phenomenological investi-
gations of embodiment is the privileging of a particular type of body: the normate body.
I begin by situating the term normate within critical disability studies and the work 
of its coiner, Rosemarie Garland- !omson. Drawing on Maurice Merleau- Ponty and 
Reiner Schürmann, I argue that the normate is the hegemonic phantasm ableism carves 
out of the "esh. !e concept of the normate functions as a corrective and a call: a correc-
tive relative to the “normal science” of phenomenology and a call for phenomenologies 
of non- normate embodiment. !e normate attunes phenomenology to the lived experi-
ences of disability and being in an ableist world.
Ableism, Meaning, and Experience
At the outset of her seminal Extraordinary Bodies, Garland- !omson notes the way in 
which disability functions as an “attribution of corporeal deviance.”3 She writes, “!e 
narrative of deviance surrounding bodies considered di"erent is paralleled by a narra-
tive of universality surrounding bodies that correspond to notions of the ordinary or 
the superlative.#.#.#. !e meanings attached to physical form and appearance constitute 
‘limits’ for many people.”4 I wish to tease out and expand upon three aspects of this 
passage as they relate to the role of the normate in Garland- !omson’s oeuvre. First, 
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as a question of attribution and narrative, disability is constituted by and through the 
stories we tell ourselves about ourselves in general and our “bodyminds,” to follow Mar-
garet Price, in particular.5 Disability cannot be understood outside of the centrality of 
its narrative role for the lived experience of sel$ood, social identity, and, in a word, our 
being- in- the- world.6
Second, disability is a question of form, mode, and matter, all of which are cast as 
deviant— not just malformed or aberrant, but a de- viation, the loss or absence of way 
and of being. “Deviance” emerges in an épistème charged with both economic and moral 
facets: being wrong or lost in the world is taken to be blameworthy, and as such, it is a 
way of being that both represents and incurs a debt. !is debt, in lockstep with nearly 
every religious tradition, is most o%en conceived as one borne through su"ering. !e 
ableist con&ation of disability with pain, su"ering, and disadvantage is at the core of 
deviance as a description of non- normate ways of being in the world.7
!ird, disability cannot be thought outside of the triumvirate of the normal, natu-
ral, and normative, to follow Gail Weiss’s apt formulation.8 Albeit o%en vaguely de'ned 
and problematically deployed across multiple domains of knowledge production, these 
terms form an intricate tapestry of ideas and assumptions that underwrite common-
sense notions of how things ought to be. !at which is normal is that which is typical. 
!at which is typical is natural, regular, common, and even universal. For example, this 
explains in part how it could be that homosexuality was medically pathologized and het-
erosexuality normalized until just a few decades ago and how it could be that the bodies 
of intersex children were mutilated as a matter of course in the name of “correcting” 
them until just a few years ago. !e historically negative inertia of the dis- in disability 
constructs a tale of psychophysiological lack and loss that, in a perfect world, should not 
be. It is the fallacy and immorality of this inertia that Garland- !omson lays bare.
Garland- !omson’s analysis of disability thus involves three central components: 
self- and social narratives, ontological deviance, and biopsychosocial typology. !e 
concept of the normate threads the hermeneutic needle between nature and culture by 
broadly de'ning human di"erence in terms of a 'gure, an archetypal representation, of 
ability that serves to ground and orient people’s sense of self. As she puts it, the normate 
is “the veiled subject position of the cultural self, the 'gure outlined by the array of devi-
ant others whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s boundaries. !e term normate 
usefully designates the social 'gure through which people can represent themselves as 
de'nitive human beings. Normate, then, is the constructed identity of those who, by 
way of the bodily con'gurations and cultural capital they assume, can step into a posi-
tion of authority and wield the power it grants them.”9 !e normate is the tain of the 
mirror of ableism. It is the invisible mechanism that allows slippage from being to being- 
able, buttressing forces from toxic individualism to social eugenics.
!e normate thus emerges in relief against both imaginary and concrete, perceived 
and real bodily di"erence. An able- bodied person talks loudly to someone in a wheel-
chair, spontaneously con&ating nonambulation with hearing loss.10 One job candidate 
is picked over another because they are perceived to be more attractive, con&ating cul-
tural ideals of beauty with labor- related abilities.11 A majority of the Supreme Court 
argues that states have a right to forcibly sterilize the “feeble- minded” in institutions, 
con&ating feeble- mindedness with both moral deviance and social &otsam.12 In each 
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case, though in di"ering ways, the judgment in question results from a con&uence of 
natural and sociocultural determinates— both surreptitiously linking and taking as given 
the categories of the normal, natural, and normative. Neither found, nor created, but 
founded, the normate shapes how things are and ought to be from behind the scenes.
Phenomenology and the Normate
We narrate our lives through horizons of ability: “I used to be able to hike that moun-
tain.” “I am much better at writing these days.” “I’m learning how to cope with my past.” 
Despite their diversity in form, content, and social signi'cance, abilities are constituted 
as abilities through assumptions and fantasies concerning normality. For example, in 
considering myself a good friend, I likely never made explicit to myself the many abil-
ities friendship requires: patience, discernment, loyalty, trust, &exibility, forgiveness, 
etc. I also may not have re&ected upon the exemplar of friendship (the ideal friend) 
whose character, or !thos, to invoke Aristotle, harmoniously bears out these many abili-
ties, acting in the right way at the right time toward the right people. Yet it is all of these 
abilities, their complex interaction, and their melding in real or imagined exemplars that 
carve the horizon of my lived experience of myself as a friend as well as my ability to 
coherently narrate that experience to myself and others.
!e normate can be understood as the ultimate ability exemplar, the exemplarity of 
which is shaped by and anchored in ableist assumptions that tell us how bodies are and 
should be. I here de'ne ableism as the assumption that the “normal” or “typical” body is 
better than the abnormal body because it is normal. Ableism assumes the normal body 
to be the regulative paradigm of human corporeal form and behavior. In claiming that 
the normate is the hegemonic phantasm ableism carves out of the &esh, I am arguing 
that the normate is more than just a paradigmatic 'gure of normality. Following Schür-
mann’s usage, a hegemonic phantasm functions as an ontological principle in the sense 
of a ground and origin: “In order to constitute the phenomenality of phenomena, in 
order to universalize them, a representational order must organize itself around a prin-
ciple, a phantasmic referent measuring all representations. A hegemonic phantasm 
[fantasme hégémonic] so conceived not only directs us to refer everything to it, but has, 
furthermore, an endless supply of signi'cations, that is to say, normative measures.”13 
!e normate is hegemonic in that it establishes a horizon of meaning that founds and 
organizes experience absolutely. It is a phantasm in that it appears absolute, while in fact 
being a construct, continually at risk of capitulation to the powers that be. As a hege-
monic phantasm, the normate o"ers an endless supply of normative measures against 
which non- normate bodies will prove to be worth less or even worthless.
While it is tempting to index the ample experiences of ability, those of the “I can,” to 
one’s particular body, the “I can” is necessarily constituted by one’s environment and 
the futures it a"ords. Ability expectations are culled not just from one’s proprioceptive- 
kinesthetic experience of one’s body, but from one’s environment and social milieu. 
Insofar as the normate, ever furnishing normative measures, reigns over the scale, 
scope, and content of ability expectations, it shapes everyone’s experience of embodi-
ment. If, as Merleau- Ponty writes, the “body is the power for a certain world,” then the 
246 Joel Michael Reynolds
normate orders and measures the interpretation and values of one’s body and its pow-
ers or, more accurately, one’s &esh.14 !e &esh, for Merleau- Ponty, names the thickness 
of embodiment, the enfolding of one within the folds of the world.15 “Every relation 
between me and Being, even vision, even speech, is#.#.#. a carnal relation with the &esh 
of the world [un rapport charnel, avec la chair du monde].”16 To think through the prob-
lematic of the normate is to think through how this thickness and enfolding is always 
already shaped by a hegemonic phantasm of able- bodiedness, shaped by unjust ability 
expectations determining how bodies should be in the very recesses of how they are. As 
such, the normate is constitutive of the &eshly possibilities of experience.
To see how the concept of the normate can aid phenomenological inquiry, take the 
example of blindness. To the phenomenologist under the sway of the normate, blind-
ness is experienced as a lack of sight. Speaking of Charles- Antoine Coypel’s studies of 
blind men, Derrida writes, “Like all blind men, they must ad- vance, advance or commit 
themselves, that is, expose themselves, run through space as if running a risk.#.#.#. !ese 
blind men explore— and seek to foresee there where they do not see, no longer see, or 
do not yet see.”17 Blindness is phenomenologically revelatory in unique respects, but it 
is o%en taken to be so primarily or solely in virtue of its relationship to sight— not as 
it is experienced in and of itself. Blindness reveals “human” lived experience through 
absence or lack of sight. !at a lack, cessation, or breaking of a thing reveals its phe-
nomenality is a commonplace in the phenomenological tradition. One need only think 
of Heidegger’s famous discussion of the hammer in Being and Time, the existential and 
ontological meaning of which is revealed precisely through an analysis of its break-
down. Yet, does the experience of blindness in fact demonstrate itself through the “lack” 
of sight?
Take the account of John Hull, who writes about his experiences of late- onset 
blindness:
First I believed that blindness was when you couldn’t see because something had 
gone wrong with your eyes. !en I understood that blindness was a deprivation of 
knowledge for which alternative sources and kinds of knowledge would compen-
sate. Gradually I came to see that blindness is a whole- body condi tion. It is not 
simply that your eyes have ceased to function; your whole body undergoes a pro-
found transformation in its relationship to the world. Finally, I came to believe that 
blindness is a world- creating condition.18
Hull’s description moves from an understanding of blindness cast in the logic of the 
ableist con&ation— blindness as lack and su"ering, as something “gone wrong”— all the 
way to a positive, generative, and rich form of life. To experience blindness as it appears 
from itself, Hull had to undermine the e"ect of the normate; he had to expel the hege-
monic phantasm already 'guring sight- as- ability/blindness- as- disability. Only then did 
he experience blindness as world- creating.19 For Hull, the light of the normate blinded 
his experience of blindness. It is with such in- sights in mind that one can “see” how 
heeding and critically interrogating the role of the normate in lived experience would 
deepen and improve phenomenologies of embodiment of every sort.
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Non- Normate Futures
Garland- !omson’s work, in concert with thinkers across the 'eld of critical disability 
studies and philosophy of disability, exposes and rebu"s the exclusions and injustices 
that situated and continue to situate the non- normate as second- class citizens or even 
subhuman.20 For Garland- !omson, disability is both the limit of and opening to under-
standing ability as an ever- present vector of lived experience and also sociopolitical 
power. “!e experience of my &esh [chair],” Merleau- Ponty writes, shows that “percep-
tion does not come to birth just anywhere.#.#.#. It emerges in the recess of a body [le recès 
d’un corps].”21 !e concept of the normate suggests that even the recesses of the body 
can harbor prejudicial assumptions. One’s body assumes and installs itself as a standard 
for experience in a manner obstinate to re&ection, as sighted assumptions about blind-
ness so well exemplify. Insofar as phenomenological inquiry is irremediably embodied, 
the normate is a concept without which phenomenology risks the errors of ableism at 
every turn. By countering the toxic universality of the typical or standard body, the con-
cept of the normate is indispensable for phenomenological inquiry committed to the 
call to behold phenomena as they appear from themselves.
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